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LEVERAGING FOREIGN INSTITUTIONAL LOGIC IN
THE ADOPTION OF STOCK OPTION PAY AMONG
JAPANESE FIRMS
XUESONG GENG,1 TORU YOSHIKAWA,1* and ASLI M. COLPAN2
1 Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University,
Singapore, Singapore
2 Graduate School of Management, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan
Research summary: We investigate why Japanese firms have adopted executive stock option
pay, which was developed with shareholder-oriented institutional logic that was inconsistent
with Japanese stakeholder-oriented institutional logic. We argue that Japanese managers have
self-serving incentives to leverage stock ownership of foreign investors and their associated
institutional logic to legitimize the adoption of stock option pay. Our empirical analyses with
a large sample of Japanese firms between 1997 and 2007 show that when managers have elite
education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, and when firms experience poor sales
growth, foreign ownership is more likely associated with the adoption of stock option pay. The
study shows the active role of managers in facilitating the diffusion of a new governance practice
embodying new institutional logic.
Managerial summary: Why have Japanese firms adopted stock option pay for executives?
Inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder-oriented tradition in corporate governance, such pay has
been believed to prioritize managerial attention to the interests of shareholders over those of other
stakeholders. However, to the extent that shareholders’ interests are legitimate in the Japanese
context, executives who have self-serving incentives to adopt such pay can leverage the need to
look after shareholders’ interest in their firms to legitimize their decisions. In a large sample of
Japanese firms, we find that foreign ownership (representing shareholders’ interests) is more likely
to be associated with the adoption of stock option pay when managers are motivated to receive
such pay, such as when they have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, or
poor sales growth. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Institutional logic (Friedland and Alford, 1991;
Lounsbury, 2007; Westphal and Zajac, 1994) in the
national corporate governance represents distinctive
and stable system in each country in terms of the
codes of good governance, the conception of firms,
and the appropriate role, rights and power of various
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eign ownership; stock option pay; practice adoption
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stakeholders (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Flig-
stein, 1996; Guillén, 2000; Whitley, 1999). Laden
with such institutional logic, governance practices
such as the board of directors and executive com-
pensation function differently in different contexts,
and the practices that have been historically taken
for granted in one context may be perceived as
inappropriate in another (Fiss and Zajac, 2004;
Sanders and Tuschke, 2007). However, the rising
presence of global institutional investors in distant
economies that have dissimilar institutional logic
may lead to the coexistence of multiple institutional
logics in a single institutional context (Ahmadjian
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and Robbins, 2005; Campbell, 2004; Desender
et al., 2014; Useem, 1998). To the extent that the
prescriptions of different logics are incompatible,
varying logics inevitably generate challenges
and tensions for organizations exposed to them
(Greenwood et al., 2011). The complex interaction
of incompatible institutional logics in terms of the
organizational adoption of foreign-originated or
contentious practices has been examined in many
contexts, such as the adoption of the U.S.-style
governance practices in Germany (Fiss and Zajac,
2004; Sanders and Tuschke, 2007) and Japan
(Desender et al., 2014), employee downsizing in
Japan (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005; Ahmadjian
and Robinson, 2001), and corporate restructur-
ing in Taiwan (Chung and Luo, 2008a, 2008b).
Organizations have been found less likely to adopt
new or contentious practices if they are heavily
embedded in existing institutions or have powerful
constituents resisting new institutional logic.
Despite the importance of the process by which
organizations respond to multiple or incompatible
institutional logics, our understanding of why
and how organizations respond remains selective
(Pache and Santos, 2010; for a review see Green-
wood et al., 2011). Recent studies have focused on
the role of human agencies (e.g., managers) that,
despite being embedded in the existing institutional
field, are aware of and receptive to the new logic
and thus become change agents in adopting novel
practices embodying new or even conflicting
institutional logic (Chung and Luo, 2008a; Fiss
and Zajac, 2004; Sanders and Tuschke, 2007).
These studies focus on the impact of managers’
beliefs about the added value of new practice for
the business operation in the prevailing institutional
environment. Although researchers have discussed
the role of change agents’ self-interests in adopting
new practices (Capron and Guillén, 2009; Clemens
and Cook, 1999), insufficient attention has been
given to examine the process by which change
agents advance their self-interests when multiple
institutional logics coexist and how such behavior
influences the diffusion of new practices in an
institutional context. Put differently, new practices
and institutional logics may be adopted not because
managers believe they are superior or value-added
for the firm, but because they are useful for man-
agers to gain personal benefit that is not possible
with the prevailing institutional logic. According
to a large and growing literature on the behavioral
theory of corporate governance (for a review see
Westphal and Zajac, 2013), managerial behavior is
contingent on the social context and how managers
interpret and take advantage of the prevailing insti-
tutional logic to realize their personal agendas. For
example, CEOs may put themselves in a favorable
light by changing the explanation for their compen-
sation plans or performance in the proxy statement
according to whether the prevailing institutional
logic is “corporate logic,” “agency logic,” or “neo-
corporate logic” (Westphal and Park, 2012; Zajac
and Westphal, 1995, 2004). However, very few
studies have applied this perspective to examine
managerial behavior under multiple institutional
logics.
We aim to close this research gap by examining
how a foreign governance practice has been adopted
in a local institutional context through the attempts
of institutionally embedded managers to pursue
their self-interests. In particular, we investigate the
adoption of stock option pay for executives from
1997 to 2007 with a large sample of Japanese firms.
Japan provides a unique context with coexistence
of alternative institutional logics in corporate gov-
ernance; majority of domestic institutional owners
follow stakeholder logic that protects the interests
of stakeholders (e.g., employees and business
partners), whereas increasing foreign institutional
investors promote shareholder logic that priori-
tizes the interest of shareholders (Ahmadjian and
Robbins, 2005; David et al., 2010). Stock option
pay is consistent with shareholder logic because
it links executive compensation to the future stock
price and therefore provides financial incentives
for managers to increase the stock price that serves
shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Westphal and Zajac, 1994). Although one
may expect this new practice as not fully compat-
ible with stakeholder logic, the diffusion of it was
not much contested in Japan (Ahmadjian, 2003).
We suggest that this is because stock option pay
is aligned with managerial interest that can be
better served with alternative institutional logic. To
pursue their self-interests but to avoid repercussion
from prevailing stakeholder logic, change-minded
managers can leverage foreign ownership to justify
the adoption of stock option pay because it is legit-
imate to serve the interest of foreign owners in the
Japanese context where stakeholder logic prescribes
a balanced view of accommodating the interests of
all stakeholders including return-oriented investors.
Consistent with this view, our empirical analyses
show that the positive effect of foreign ownership
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 37: 1472–1492 (2016)
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on the adoption of stock option pay is more
pronounced when Japanese managers possess
greater human capital, or when the current pay
scheme and firm’s growth prospect require a better
justification for additional executive pay. Joining
the growing literature on socially embedded change
agency and institutional logic (e.g., Greenwood and
Suddaby, 2006; Greenwood et al., 2011; Westphal
and Zajac, 2013), we provide a new perspective:
that powerful constituents of firms (e.g., foreign
investors) embodying alternative institutional logic
have to be combined with managerial self-interest
to influence the diffusion of a new practice that is
originated from a foreign institutional context.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Corporate governance and institutional logic
The stable interactions between organizational
actors and institutional environment facilitate the
development of institutional logic of corporate
governance in a national context (Friedland and
Alford, 1991; Lounsbury, 2007). It is composed
of assumptions, norms, values, beliefs, rules, and
practices in an institutional field that structure a
collective understanding of how actors’ interests,
organizational goals, and salient issues are formu-
lated, and what means or solutions are regarded
as appropriate to achieve these. For instance, the
institutionalized agency logic depicts the firm as
an entity owned by shareholders and therefore
the long-term incentive plan for executives is a
legitimate practice because it ostensibly motivates
them to increase shareholder value (Zajac and
Westphal, 1995, 2004).
Although many institutional studies have focused
on dominant logic within a country, more recent
ones emphasize the existence of multiple and
even competing logics in an institutional field
(e.g., Greenwood et al., 2010; Lounsbury, 2007;
Thornton, 2004). This new focus is pertinent to
research on international corporate governance
because the globalization of the capital market
entails the coexistence of multiple logics in terms
of how firms are governed in many countries.
Large institutional investors who invest globally
often play an important role in bringing the distinct
logic from their home countries to other institu-
tional contexts (Useem, 1998). These institutional
investors have been accumulating stocks outside
their home countries in order to diversify risk and
maximize return. When these global investors carry
shareholder logic with them, corporate governance
practices and systems in many countries are
increasingly influenced by institutional logic from
the shareholder-oriented corporate governance
model (e.g., Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Meyer and
Hollerer, 2010; Sanders and Tuschke, 2007).
The coexistence of multiple institutional logics
has important implications on how organizational
actors mobilize their power and resources to
achieve their goals. Combining the institutional
logic perspective (e.g., Friedland and Alford, 1991;
Lounsbury, 2007) with the embedded change
agency perspective (e.g., Greenwood and Suddaby,
2006; Westphal and Zajac, 2013) can provide a
useful theoretical angle for understanding how
key organizational actors (e.g., managers) can
utilize foreign institutional logic to advance their
own interests that might have been suppressed
in an existing institution (Seo and Creed, 2002).
A certain institutional environment can either
constrain or empower certain organizational actors.
For instance, German workers can advance their
interests in a stakeholder-oriented system through
board representation, which is normally lacking in
the U.S. context, where the rights of shareholders
are more emphasized (Capron and Guillén, 2009;
Schneper and Guillén, 2004). If the interest of an
organizational actor cannot be maximized with
the prevailing institutional logic, the introduction
of a new and alternative logic may provide oppor-
tunities, thus increasing his or her motivation for
change (Clemens and Cook, 1999; Seo and Creed,
2002). However, these change-minded actors
continue to face the pressures to conform to the
existing institutional logic. As such, it is important
to understand how these potential change agents
can solve the “paradox of embedded action”; i.e.,
“how can actors change institutions if their actions,
intentions, and rationality are all conditioned by
the very institution they wish to change?” (Holm,
1995: 398; Seo and Creed, 2002: 223).
Empirically, some studies have focused on how
the varying embeddedness of an organization or
its stakeholders in a particular institutional envi-
ronment results in different constraints to change
that, in turn, can influence these actors’ incentive
to initiate change (e.g., Ahmadjian and Robbins,
2005; Yoshikawa, Tsui-Auch, and McGuire, 2007).
Other studies have focused on the varying levels
of awareness and acceptance of new alternatives by
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 37: 1472–1492 (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
Leveraging Foreign Institutional Logic 1475
key corporate leaders due to their educational back-
ground, exposure to the new logic, or connections to
organizations that have adopted new logic (Chung
and Luo, 2008b; Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Sanders and
Tuschke, 2007). Extant studies have also suggested
that new and divergent institutional logic may pro-
vide an opportunity for change agents to explore
nontraditional means and give them more latitude
to justify such exploration (e.g., Chung and Luo,
2008a; Clemens and Cook, 1999). We extend the
latter line of inquiry and examine how a key change
agent (i.e., managers) utilizes the presence of pow-
erful organizational constituents (e.g., foreign own-
ers) who promote a new and alternative institutional
logic to justify the adoption of a new corporate gov-
ernance practice that will help realize their private
goals, at the same time facilitating the diffusion of
the new practice. Next, we apply this theoretical
perspective to Japanese corporate governance and
examine the interplay between Japanese executives
and foreign owners on managerial decision to adopt
stock option pay for executives.
Institutional logic and Japanese
corporate governance
Japanese corporate governance has been institution-
alized to empower some organizational actors (e.g.,
domestic institutional owners and employees) and
constrain others (e.g., arm’s-length investors). In
the Japanese stakeholder-oriented model, domes-
tic institutional owners like banks and nonfinancial
firms own shares in other firms to ensure sales and
business transactions (e.g., buyer–supplier relation-
ship or loan borrower–lender relationship), thereby
allowing them to protect the interests of important
stakeholders, such as employees and business part-
ners (Aoki, Jackson, and Miyajima, 2007; Geda-
jlovic and Shapiro, 2002; Sheard, 1994). As such,
these domestic institutional owners, also called rela-
tional owners, tend to value long-term growth and
expanding market share, which provide greater ben-
efits to key stakeholders, rather than short-term
profitability or higher share price, which benefits
return-oriented shareholders (Ahmadjian and Rob-
bins, 2005; Gerlach, 1992).
Nevertheless, foreign investors have become
an emerging presence in the Japanese capital
markets since the 1990s, when the economic
downturn made it difficult for financially troubled
domestic owners to maintain historic levels of
ownership and, foreign investors often stepped
in to purchase shares, resulting in a net shift of
ownership toward greater holdings by foreign
investors (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001). These
foreign owners are predominantly institutional
investors from the U.S. and the U.K., which
accounted for 32 and 39 percent, respectively, of
all foreign shareholdings in Japanese firms in 1997
(Bank of Japan, 2008). (We use foreign institutional
investors and foreign owners interchangeably in this
paper.)
Prior studies (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005;
David et al., 2010 for Japanese firms; Fiss and
Zajac, 2004 for German firms) assumed foreign
institutional investors tend to follow shareholder
logic and found confirming evidence. Such logic
treats the primary objective of the firm as to “max-
imize shareholder value” and other stakeholders
as the means for serving the ultimate interests of
shareholders (Fligstein, 1996; Useem, 1998; West-
phal and Zajac, 1994). While the dominant foreign
investors in Japanese firms are from the U.S and
the U.K. that likely follow shareholder logic, there
are foreign investors from other countries where
different logics may prevail (e.g., Hall and Soskice,
2001). We suggest, however, that the assumption
used in previous studies can still be applicable
here for several reasons. First, foreign investors
tend to be active traders of their shareholdings.1
Therefore, the influence of shareholder logic
represented by American and British institutional
investors can be dominating. Second, relative to
domestic institutional owners, who have various
relationships with the firm, foreign investors lack
means to gain benefit other than stock returns from
their investment (David et al., 2010). Therefore,
even though they may come from countries with
different institutional logics, they are very likely to
adopt shareholder logic that focuses on investment
return (Desender et al., 2014). Moreover, we found
evidence from the annual reports of Japanese firms
that top management often associated foreign
owners with the pressure for higher share prices,
even though none of them mentioned the country
origin of foreign owners. This suggests that foreign
ownership as a whole is perceived to impose strong
pressure on managers to pay close attention to
shareholder interests.
1 For example, foreign investors accounted for more than
50 percent of the total trading in the Tokyo Stock Exchange in
2007 even though their total shareholding was less than 20 percent
(Tokyo Stock Exchange, 2008).
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 37: 1472–1492 (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
1476 X. Geng, T. Yoshikawa, and A. M. Colpan
Despite the relatively small shareholding of for-
eign investors, they tend substantially to affect
the share prices and potentially the strategic deci-
sions of Japanese firms because they buy and sell
shares more frequently than domestic owners and
they like to communicate with top management
directly (e.g., Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005; Col-
pan et al., 2011; Desender et al., 2014; Yoshikawa
et al., 2005). However, in the Japanese context,
these return-oriented shareholders have been nor-
mally treated as just one of multiple stakeholders
of a firm whose interests need not be prioritized
(Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Hall and Soskice,
2001). Contrasting the rising influence of foreign
investors and domestic Japanese firms embedded in
the local system that emphasizes relational ties with
key stakeholders, Ahmadjian and Robbins (2005)
call it a “crash of capitalisms” because of their dis-
tinctively different institutional logics. Such con-
trast is also echoed in other studies (Guillén, 2000;
Hall and Soskice, 2001).
Adoption of stock option pay and powerful
owners in Japanese firms
In 1997, stock option pay was first legalized in
Japan, and Japanese firms gradually began to adopt
this practice. Prior to the legalization, Japanese
managers were mainly paid a fixed salary with
an annual or semi-annual cash bonus (Yoshikawa,
Rasheed, and Del Brio, 2010). The new practice
was actually requested from the business commu-
nity. When the Keidanren, the Japanese Business
Association representing the interests of large firms,
pressed for the legalization of stock option pay
(Colpan and Yoshikawa, 2012). After the legal-
ization, stock option pay diffused among Japanese
firms fairly soon without much resistance (Ahmad-
jian, 2003).
According to agency theory, to align the manage-
rial interest with that of shareholders, a firm can use
outcome-based mechanisms, such as stock option
pay, to forge a common economic bond between
managers and shareholders (Fama, 1980; Jensen
and Meckling, 1976). Stock option pay encour-
ages managers to take on projects that positively
affect the future stock price of a firm because the
value of stock options depends on the stock price
of the firm in the future (Sanders, 2001; Sanders
and Hambrick, 2007). Although there remain some
debates on the pay–performance relationship (Dev-
ers et al., 2007), many empirical studies have shown
that such incentive-based pay is positively related
to share price performance, suggesting the moti-
vational effect of stock option pay for managers.
Indeed, stock option pay can lead managers to pay
greater attention to the stock price and prioritize the
interests of shareholders over those of other stake-
holders, even in the Japanese context. For example,
Kato et al. (2005) found that the adoption of stock
option pay in Japanese firms was associated with
increased stock performance post-adoption, sug-
gesting the shift of managerial attention.
As such, return-oriented foreign investors
would favor stock option pay. For example, it has
been found that foreign investors from the U.S.
regard stock option pay favorably in Japanese
firms because such pay is common in their home
country (Miyoshi and Nakao, 2011). Stock option
pay is not only a legitimate practice for foreign
investors but also important for assurance of
their investment return when they lack access to
alternative mechanisms of control such as active
board monitoring (Charkham, 1994; Desender
et al., 2014). When foreign institutional investors
become more powerful with greater shareholding,
they are more capable of promoting the practice
for their benefit (Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Sanders and
Tuschke, 2007). Thus, our baseline prediction is
that Japanese firms with large foreign ownership
will face greater pressure to adopt stock option pay.
Managers as embedded agents in adopting
stock option pay
What is puzzling is that, despite the small share-
holding by foreign investors relative to domestic
owners and shareholder-serving stock option
pay that is not entirely consistent with stakeholder
logic, many Japanese firms still opted to adopt stock
option pay after its legalization in 1997 (Ahmad-
jian, 2003). Indeed, it has been found that foreign
practice tends to be resisted in an environment
with incompatible institutional logic. For instance,
Ahmadjian and Robbins (2005) and Ahmadjian
and Robinson (2001) found that downsizing, well
accepted in the U.S. context, faced strong resis-
tance in Japanese firms with large domestic owners
because it challenged the core value of permanent or
long-term employment in Japan. Similarly, Chung
and Luo (2008b) found that family-controlled
business groups in Taiwan did not smoothly adopt
corporate refocusing, which is consistent with
shareholder logic. Fiss and Zajac (2004) and
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Sanders and Tuschke (2007) also found that the
new executive compensation plan faced opposition
from powerful domestic owners in the German
context, which valued stakeholder logic.
We propose that the legalization and diffusion
of stock option pay did not face strong resistance
among Japanese firms because it was aligned with
managerial interests even in a stakeholder-oriented
context such as Japan. Japanese managers may
have been motivated to adopt stock option pay for
additional financial gains if they could justify the
adoption to other stakeholders. We suggest that this
situation is due to several contextual characteristics
of the Japanese corporate environment.
First, in the Japanese context, managers can
enjoy higher discretion in their decision-making
as long as it does not jeopardize the interests
of key stakeholders. While it is normal for the
board of directors to make decisions on executive
compensation in U.S. firms, the top managers in
Japanese firms have a significant influence on their
own compensation because directors of Japanese
firm are mostly insiders and most firms do not have
the remuneration committee (Charkham, 1994). In
addition, stock option pay is usually granted to all
directors, who are mostly executives themselves,
hence they do not normally object to the CEO’s
compensation proposal (Colpan and Yoshikawa,
2012; Miyoshi and Nakao, 2011). Further, large
domestic owners usually do not intervene in the
management of their affiliated and business partner
firms as long as it conforms to general norms, even
in recent years when firm performance has shown
decline (Lincoln and Gerlach, 2004). Therefore,
managers have high discretion in proposing the
adoption of stock option pay as long as it comes
with reasonable justification.
Second, stock option pay in Japan is more likely
to provide significant upside financial gain for man-
agers. Stock option pay can potentially increase the
uncertainty of financial gain and personal risk for
managers when it is paid as a substitute for other
compensation components (Sanders, 2001). In the
U.S. context, managers have been found to prefer a
lower proportion of stock options in their pay pack-
age, because stock option pay increases uncertainty
in future managerial income and decreases man-
agerial autonomy to pursue their self-interests (e.g.,
Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Westphal and Zajac,
1994). However, stock options are usually granted
in addition to, not of as a substitute for, existing
salaries and cash bonuses of executives in Japanese
firms (Colpan and Yoshikawa, 2012). Kubo (2010)
found that regular managerial pay and bonus did not
decline after the adoption of stock option pay, sug-
gesting that stock options are granted on top of exec-
utives’ current pay. Therefore, such compensation
ensures Japanese managers with potential financial
gains with limited risk of income uncertainty. The
incentives of managers to adopt stock option pay
are thus increased. Our personal interview with an
ex-CEO of a large Japanese firm has confirmed that
managers are motivated by potential financial gains
from stock option pay.2
Third, the stakeholder-oriented institutional
logic in Japan can actually provide the justification
needed for managers to adopt stock option pay,
which is normally thought to privilege the interests
of shareholders over those of other stakeholders.
Although shareholders should be treated as just
one of the multiple stakeholders of a firm under
stakeholder logic (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003;
Hall and Soskice, 2001), such logic normally takes
a balanced view among the interests of multiple
stakeholders (Fiss and Zajac, 2004). Therefore, the
interests of foreign investors are also legitimate in
this logic. The implication of this balanced view is
that managers can be justified in taking actions to
serve the interests of shareholders to the extent that
the stake of return-oriented shareholders is signifi-
cant in a firm, as long as such action does not jeop-
ardize the interests of other significant stakeholders.
In summary, these contextual characteristics of
Japanese corporate governance provide latitude for
managers to leverage the coexisting shareholder
and stakeholder logics to advance their own inter-
est. For that purpose, managers may behave as the
embedded agency constrained by the local institu-
tional logic, and yet have partial autonomy to act
on their interests (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006;
Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). To realize their inter-
ests, however, managers need to alleviate the ten-
sion between the new practice based on shareholder
logic and the prevailing stakeholder logic (Oliver,
1991; Thornton, 2002; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008).
The alternative institutional logic can provide nec-
essary opportunities for embedded agencies to cope
2 The CEO mentioned that managers can be motivated by financial
gains through stock option pay (“The reason I had decided to adopt
the stock option plan then was that I thought that stock price was
one of the important indicators for management. … I wanted to
use the plan as financial incentives to executives so that we could
improve the quality of management. … ”).
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proactively with institutional constraints (Green-
wood et al., 2010). Indeed, we found that it is typ-
ical in the announcement of the adoption of stock
option pay to use firm performance and shareholder
interest to justify this additional pay.3 In the follow-
ing sections, we will identify situations under which
managers are likely to face a higher tension between
their self-interest and institutional constraints, and
hence are more likely to utilize the presence of
foreign ownership to justify the adoption of stock
option pay, making the effect of foreign ownership
more salient.
Managerial educational background
We suggest that managers have greater incentives
to adopt stock option pay for additional financial
gains if they are highly talented (i.e., possessing
3 We found that the typical rationale described in the annual
reports for the adoption was usually twofold. One rationale
is that the incentive pay will motivate managers to improve
corporate performance. For example, stock option pay was used
“in order to provide managers with an incentive to achieve
the 2003–2005 medium-term management plan and improve
general corporate performances” (2003), or to make managers
and directors “interested in and determined to improve TMC’s
performance and enhance TMC’s international competitiveness”
(1997). Another annual report mentioned, “Lawson will continue
its stock option program for executive officers to provide greater
incentive for them to excel. The conditions for exercising stock
options are set so as to motivate executive officers to increase
Lawson’s corporate value over the medium and long terms”
(2002)”
The other rationale is explicitly that stock option pay was utilized
to motivate the top management team to pay attention to increase
the shareholder value creation (i.e., higher stock price). Here are
several typical quotes from annual reports: “The Company has
introduced a stock option plan for its directors to further moti-
vate them to consider growth in investors’ value as their chief
management goal and to otherwise manage in a manner that is
in the best interest of shareholders (1998),” “The scheme aims
to further encourage directors and associate directors to enhance
mid-to-long-term corporate value by aligning their perspectives
with those of shareholders” (2000), “For the purpose of enhancing
the connection between the stock price and the results of oper-
ation, and the remuneration to the Directors (other than outside
Directors), and inducing the Directors of the Company to share
the interest associated with the fluctuation of the stock price of
the Company’s shares with all the shareholders of the Company
and to further encourage their desire and morale to contribute to
the enhancement of the corporate value of the Company (2007),”
“Kyocera will use a new incentive stock option program to align
the interest of shareholders with those of Kyocera management
and employees” (2000).
Some annual reports provided both rationales simultaneously:
“The intention of MCC is to make the compensation scheme for
the Directors and Officers which increases connectivity to the
business performance of MCC and shareholder value (2005),”
or “which will increase linkage of compensation to the business
performance of the Company and shareholder value” (2005).
high human capital). Managers with greater talent
and competence are able to create higher value for
the firm. However, Japanese compensation culture
tends to emphasize equality between employees,
including senior managers, rather than pure meri-
tocracy (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985; Clark, 1979).
Employees collectively are regarded as contribut-
ing to the value of the firm and therefore should
be compensated in an egalitarian manner. More-
over, Japanese seniority-based compensation cul-
ture favors managers with a longer tenure in the firm
but not necessarily for their individual contributions
(Abegglen and Stalk, 1985). Thus, top managers
with greater talent might not be fairly compensated
for what they have contributed to the value of the
firm and stock option pay provides a new oppor-
tunity for them to realize their contributions (e.g.,
Chung and Luo, 2008a).
We can use educational background to gauge
the human capital and talents of managers (e.g.,
Perez-Gonzalez, 2006). Educational background
shapes not only the perceptions of professional
managers (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), but also
the cognitive models as well as the caliber of man-
agers in the business field. For example, educational
background in economics or business is found to
have different effects on the decision-making style
of managers compared with other disciplines (e.g.,
Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Sanders and Tuschke, 2007).
Managers with graduate degrees may be trained
to handle complex information and find solutions
effectively (Young, Charns, and Shortell, 2001).
CEOs graduated from elite schools may be more
capable of learning new and more efficient organi-
zational practices (e.g., Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou,
1993). Similarly, we suggest that managers who
graduated from elite universities are more likely
to have greater talent and competence for manag-
ing and creating value for their companies (Chang
and Shim, 2014). But the Japanese egalitarian- and
seniority-based corporate culture provides limited
opportunities for them to increase pay based on their
contributions. Hence, these managers may have
greater incentives to adopt stock option pay, but they
still need to find reasonable justification for their
action especially as they may draw greater atten-
tion due to their elite status. The presence of large
foreign ownership provides one such justification
for managers because Japanese stakeholder logic
allows managers to take actions to serve the inter-
ests of shareholders. We therefore suggest that the
positive effect of foreign ownership on the adoption
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of stock option pay will be greater when managers
are more motivated to leverage the presence of large
foreign ownership to justify their actions.
Hypothesis 1: The more a firm’s executives who
graduated from elite Japanese universities, the
stronger the positive relationship between for-
eign ownership and the adoption of stock option
pay for executives.
Deviant practice experience
Even in the egalitarian culture of Japanese firms, the
pay inequality between top managers and average
employees still exists. Talented managers who con-
tribute more to the firm may still be rewarded with
higher pay in some firms, and such rewards are usu-
ally in the form of cash bonuses (Yoshikawa et al.,
2010). Given that Japanese institutional norms gen-
erally do not support differential pay with signif-
icant inequality, the presence of inequality in pay
between managers and average employees likely
suggests that managers may have developed an
organizational environment where some deviations
from the norms are acceptable. Previous adoption
of another institutionally contested practice may
smooth the way for subsequent adoptions and there-
fore firms with deviant practice experience are
more likely to do so again (Sanders and Tuschke,
2007). For instance, the adoption of the interna-
tional accounting standards is a predictor of change
to a more market-oriented and shareholder-oriented
corporate governance in Germany (Fiss and Zajac,
2004; Tuschke and Sanders, 2003). Japanese man-
agers that had already adopted a deviant pay scheme
(i.e., high pay inequality) may thus have incen-
tives to continue the momentum and adopt stock
option pay.
But managerial compensation with increasing
inequality is not aligned with Japanese norms and
hence is likely to attract close attention in the egali-
tarian environment. Given that these managers are
already receiving larger compensation relative to
other employees, they will need further justification
if they choose to adopt stock option pay, which is
poised to widen the pay gap even further.4 Again,
4 Japanese firms can grant stock options to both executives and
employees. We found that most companies that had awarded stock
options to employees did so only to those above mid-management
level positions, not to all employees. Also, the amounts granted to
individual employees were usually far smaller than those granted
the presence of large foreign ownership provides
such an opportunity because stock option pay can be
justified as serving the legitimate interests of share-
holders even if it is also aligned with the personal
interests of managers.
Hypothesis 2: The greater pay inequality
between top managers and average employees
in a firm, the stronger the positive relationship
between foreign ownership and the adoption of
stock option pay for executives.
Firm growth
Economic performance of firms is also likely to
influence the decision of managers to adopt stock
option pay. Low efficiency and effectiveness can
motivate organizations to reassess their respective
institutionalized practices (Oliver, 1991) and, in
turn, may lead those organizations to adopt new
practices (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Kraatz
and Zajac, 1996). In firms undergoing declining per-
formance or stagnant sales growth, greater manage-
rial efforts are expected to redesign their structure or
strategy. Studies show that poor firm performance
leads to the dissatisfaction of stakeholders, subse-
quently decreasing their commitment and triggering
political conflicts over existing arrangements (Child
and Smith, 1987). In the Japanese context, foreign
owners are concerned mainly about profitability,
whereas domestic Japanese owners emphasize sta-
bility and growth (David et al., 2010; Gerlach, 1992;
Yoshikawa et al., 2005). When managers cannot
maintain satisfactory growth, serving the interests
of domestic stakeholders becomes difficult. How-
ever, stock option pay is used to motivate managers
to increase future share price, which might not be of
the best interest of relational domestic stakeholders.
As such, managers who are motivated to adopt stock
option pay need to provide stronger justification to
these concerned stakeholders.
Nevertheless, while poor performance increases
the subjective uncertainty for managers in mak-
ing decisions, it also permits managers who are
less committed to prevailing governance to dis-
cuss legitimately and promote alternative configura-
tions (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Oliver, 1991).
Indeed, poorly performing firms tend to be earlier
to executives. So in most cases in Japan, stock option pay usually
widens the pay gaps between executives and average employees.
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adopters of new practices (Chizema, 2010). More-
over, managers can be creative in utilizing the pre-
vailing institutional logic to create justification for
their behaviors. For example, Westphal and Park
(2012) find that, facing poor performance, CEOs
tend to assert the quality of firm leadership and
managerial decisions by asserting the quality of the
independent board of directors in their company.
Such rhetoric draws on the well accepted agency
or shareholder logic of governance that empha-
sizes board independence (Westphal and Zajac,
2013). Similarly, we suggest that managers facing
slow growth and pressure from relational stake-
holders may cite the interests of foreign investors
to justify the adoption of stock option pay. There-
fore, we suggest the impact of foreign owner-
ship becomes greater when a firm’s growth rate
is low.
Hypothesis 3: The lower a firm’s sales growth
rate, the stronger the positive relationship
between foreign ownership and the adoption of
stock option pay for executives.
METHODS
Sample
Prior to 1997, Japanese firms were prohibited by
law from issuing stock options to their manage-
ment and employees. The Commercial Code was
amended to allow firms to grant stock option pay
as compensation to managers and key employees
effective from June 1, 1997. Therefore, our primary
data consist of all adoptions of stock option plans
following the legal amendment by all firms listed in
the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE)
between 1997 and 2007. The number of firms in
this section ranges from 1,475 in 1997 to 1,642 in
2007 and exiting firms were due to mergers, acqui-
sitions, or delisting rather than bankruptcy. Data
on ownership, management compensation, financial
data, monthly share-prices, and other firm charac-
teristics were collected from Nikkei Needs database,
Kaisha Shikiho (Japan Company Handbook), and
Yuka Shoken Hokokusho (Report on Securities that
each listed firm is required to file with the Ministry
of Finance). Since we lagged one year for all the
independent variables in the analyses, we collected
the data from 1996. Data on stock option plans
between 1997 and 2003 were obtained from Daiwa
Securities SMBC Co. Ltd. and the data between
2003 and 2007 were obtained from Mizuho Secu-
rities Co. Ltd. Both companies collected the stock
option information from the complete TSE secu-
rities reports. Seven hundred thirty-one firm-year
observations could not be used in the analyses
because of substantial missing data in key vari-
ables. The final sample consists of 1,547 firms out
of which 584 firms had adopted stock option pay for
executives by 2007.
Dependent variable and estimation method
Our dependent variable is the adoption of stock
option pay for executives, which is a dummy vari-
able denoting the announcement of stock option
plan by a firm in a year. The firm was removed
from the sample after its initial adoption of the
stock option plan. The annual number of announce-
ments increased till 2000 and dropped afterwards.
According to Daiwa Securities SMBC, approx-
imately 38 percent of all Japanese public firms
had adopted stock options as of March 2005. The
figure is almost identical to the adoption rate of
37.8 percent (584/1,547) in our sample.
We used discrete-time event history analysis to
model adoption process. The adoption of stock
option pay can happen at any time within a year, but
we updated the observation annually and actually
grouped the events into year intervals. Since we did
not have any a priori assumption about the baseline
hazard rate of stock option adoption in Japan, we
employed the Cox proportional hazards model
with the form: h(t)= q(t)exp[bX(t)] (Blossfeld,
Golsch, and Rohwer, 2007; Cleves et al., 2010):
h(t) is the hazard rate of a firm to initialize stock
option plan in year t given that it has not done so
by year t; q(t) is the unspecified function of time
dependence giving the baseline hazard of adoption
occurring in a year. X(t) is a vector of independent
variables, including both time invariant variables
(for instance industry dummies) and time variant
variables (for instance firm age), and their inter-
actions, while b is a vector of the coefficients to
be estimated. One unit change in Xk increases the
hazard rate by exp(bk) in the multiplicative term:
h(t, Xk +ΔXk, X)/h(t, Xk, X). The event-history
model is good at handling right-censoring when the
event occurs after the study period, but a limitation
of the Cox model is in dealing with left-censoring
when the event occurs before the study period.
Our sample begins with the year 1997, coinciding
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 37: 1472–1492 (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
Leveraging Foreign Institutional Logic 1481
with the onset of legalization of stock option pay
in Japan and left censoring is not a serious issue in
our analysis.
Independent variables
Foreign ownership is the percentage of shares held
by foreign investors in a firm’s total outstanding
shares. Firms do not disclose the identity of these
foreign owners and we use their aggregated shares.
Although the ownership structure in our sample is
stable temporally and our interest is the impact of
ownership structure on a firm’s decision to adopt
a stock option plan, owners may change their
shareholdings in a firm after the adoption because
agency cost can vary depending on the influence of
such pay (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
To account for this reversed causality problem, we
lagged all independent variables by one year.
To gauge the difference in top managers’ edu-
cational background, we measure Elite managers
as the proportion of executives or directors (i.e.,
top managers in Japan), who graduated from
prestigious Japanese universities. Japan has two
clearly differentiated types of universities. Elite
former imperial universities are widely known as
more rigorous and selective than other universities
in their student selection. Seven imperial univer-
sities (Tokyo, Kyoto, Tohoku, Osaka, Kyushu,
Hokkaido, Nagoya), and two other elite univer-
sities (Hitotsubashi and Kobe) conduct their own
rigorous entrance examinations for admission that
depends solely on students’ academic performance
and talents (Mehrotra et al., 2013). Admission to
these elite universities is merit-based and very
competitive regardless of the family background of
the applicants. A degree from one of these presti-
gious universities reliably implies a high level of
intelligence, personal ability, and a network of high
capability alumni after graduation. A top manage-
ment team with more graduates from elite Japanese
universities indicates higher human capital. Data
on educational background of managers/directors
were collected from Yakuin Shikiho (Director
Handbook).
For the previous deviant managerial practices,
we measure Pay inequality as the ratio of average
compensation to executives over the average
compensation to nonexecutive employees. We
collected information on compensation paid to
top management teams and all employees from
Nikkei Needs database and Kaisha Shikiho (Japan
Company Handbook). We divide the compensation
to the entire top management team by the number
of managers to obtain the average compensation
to executives, and divide the compensation to all
employees (less top management) by the total
number of employees (less top management team)
to obtain the average compensation to nonexecu-
tive employees. The pay inequality varies across
industries; we adjust this measure by dividing it
by the three-digit industry average pay inequality.
Higher value of this variable indicates executive
pay more deviant from the industry norm.
Sales growth is calculated as the annual growth
rate in total sales. High sales growth indicates
promising market demand and future growth oppor-
tunities (David et al., 2010). To test the moderating
effect according to Hypotheses 1–3, we create inter-
action variables between Foreign ownership and
Elite managers, Pay inequality, and Sales growth.
Following prior research on corporate gover-
nance (e.g., Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001; Fiss
and Zajac, 2004; Sanders and Tuschke, 2007; West-
phal and Zajac, 1994) and recent studies on stock
option pay in Japan (e.g., Kato et al., 2005; Miyoshi
and Nakao, 2011; Nagaoka, 2005), we use sev-
eral control variables that may correlate with both
dependent and independent variables. Firm size is
the natural logarithm of the total assets of the firm.
Firm age is the age of the firm from its incorporation
year. Profitability is the profit before taxes divided
by total assets. Debt/asset is the ratio of total debt to
total assets. Volatility is the standard deviation of a
firm’s stock returns for the past 24 months adjusted
by the average share price. Domestic ownership is
the percentage of shares held by Japanese domes-
tic financial institutions (i.e., large local banks and
insurance companies) and nonfinancial firms in
total outstanding shares.5 Managerial ownership is
the percentage of shares held by the top manage-
ment team in total outstanding shares. Executive
bonus ratio is the cash bonus received by top execu-
tives divided by their total compensation, exclusive
of the stock option pay. To account for the cash con-
straint of a firm and the shareholders’ rights, we use
5 We did not include the domestic individual ownership in this
measure. Some Japanese investors, including investment trust
firms (similar to mutual funds), are more transaction-oriented and
return-oriented, like foreign institutional investors. As sharehold-
ings by these Japanese owners are small (their average sharehold-
ing is less than 2.6% in our sample firms) and our focus is domestic
relational investors, we did not include these types of investors in
measuring domestic ownership.
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the dummy variable Dividend, taking a value of 1
if the firm paid a dividend in a year. Keiretsu is a
dummy variable indicating the firm belongs to one
of the large Japanese Keiretsu or business groups.
The data on Japanese Keiretsu were collected from
Nihon no Kogyo Group Souran (Japanese Keiretsu
Directory) and Yuka Shoken Hokokusho (Security
Report). Subsidiary is a dummy variable indicat-
ing the firm is a subsidiary of another firm. Man-
agement controlled is a dummy variable indicating
the aggregate ownership by managers is higher than
50 percent of the total ownership of the firm. Man-
agers with controlling ownership may have high
latitude in promoting stock option pay. To control
for the institutional pressure, we measure Preva-
lence of stock option adoption as the number of
firms that started to adopt stock option pay in a
particular year. More firms adopting the new prac-
tice can increase the legitimacy of the practice in
existing institutional context, facilitating additional
adoption (Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001). Finally,
since our sample is broadly cross-sectional in the
Japanese economy, we use a series of three-digit
industry dummies to control for the fixed industry
effects.
RESULTS
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for main
variables used in the model. Most firms (>99.5%)
in the sample have much higher domestic ownership
than foreign ownership, indicating these firms’ high
embeddedness in the Japanese business system. In
addition, we removed some outliers with extreme
values (e.g., extremely high sales growth or pay
inequality). Dropping these outliers does not change
the regression results.
Table 2 reports the results of the event history
analyses for the hypotheses. Only Model 1 includes
all the control variables, including the moderator
variables such as Elite managers, Pay inequality,
and Sales growth in Model 1; but we find no
significant independent effects from them except for
Elite managers. The coefficients in Model 1 and
other models consistently show that young firms,
firms with volatile stock prices, and firms paying
dividends are more likely to adopt stock option
pay. Firms with higher managerial ownership or
a controlling management team also have higher
adoption rate. These results are consistent with
previous studies on the stock option adoption in
Japan (Hassan and Hoshino, 2008; Kato et al.,
2005; Nagaoka, 2005; Uchida, 2006). It is also
evident that the Prevalence of stock option adoption
is positively related to a focal firm’s adoption
decision. We also find that firms with more domestic
institutional owners tend to resist adopting stock
option pay. But the negative effect disappears in
other models. Some domestic owners (e.g., financial
institutional) might be more shareholder-oriented
(e.g., Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005). We split
the domestic ownership into financial domestic
ownership and corporation domestic ownership and
rerun the model, but we find both types of ownership
have negative but insignificant coefficients.
Model 2 is used to test our baseline predic-
tion by adding Foreign ownership. The coefficient
(1.97, p< 0.1%) suggests that foreign institutional
investors favor stock option plans. The coefficient is
significantly different from the negative coefficient
of Domestic ownership (p< 0.1%). An increase
of 10 percent of foreign ownership in a firm will
increase multiplicatively the hazard rate of adopt-
ing stock option pay for executives by 121.7 percent
(i.e., exp (0.1× 1.97)).
To test Hypotheses 1–3, we add the interactions
between Foreign ownership and moderator vari-
ables in the subsequent models. Model 3 adds the
interaction term Foreign ownership×Elite man-
agers with a positive coefficient (3.027, p< 1%),
supporting Hypothesis 1. Model 4 shows a pos-
itive coefficient for the interaction term Foreign
ownership×Pay inequality (0.714, p< 10%), sup-
porting Hypothesis 2. Model 5 shows the negative
coefficient (−0.191, p< 0.1%) for the interaction
term Foreign ownership× Sales growth, supporting
Hypothesis 3.
Model 6 has all three interaction terms and we
interpret the coefficients of interaction terms based
on this full model. The interpretation of interaction
effect on the change in the dependent variable in
nonlinear models is complex because the effect
depends on the value of both interacting variables
and other variables (Ai and Norton, 2003; Hoetker,
2007). However, it is not feasible in the Cox model
to make statements on absolute quantities in change
of hazard rate without estimating the baseline haz-
ard. It is most natural to interpret the coefficients
in the Cox model in terms of multiplicative effect
that does not vary with the baseline hazard rate and
other variables due to the exponential formula in
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Table 2. The likelihood of the adoption of stock option pay for executives using Cox proportional hazards models
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Foreign ownership 1.970*** 1.595*** 1.186† 2.020*** 0.730
(0.384) (0.426) (0.606) (0.383) (0.653)
Foreign ownership× elite managers 3.027 ∗ 3.306 ∗
(1.345) (1.479)
Foreign ownership× pay inequality 0.714† 0.733†
(0.431) (0.439)
Foreign ownership× sales growth −0.191*** −0.261**
(0.046) (0.087)
Elite managers 0.513† 0.391 −0.027 0.406 0.394 0.114
(0.308) (0.287) (0.359) (0.288) (0.286) (0.378)
Pay inequality 0.103 0.078 0.083 −0.052 0.079 −0.043
(0.074) (0.077) (0.077) (0.110) (0.077) (0.114)
Sales growth 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.053*** 0.073**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.023)
Firm size 0.071 0.003 −0.005 0.006 0.002 −0.016
(0.046) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.048)
Firm age −0.012*** −0.012*** −0.012*** −0.012*** −0.012*** −0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Profitability 0.282 −0.264 −0.313 −0.290 −0.257 −0.482
(0.908) (0.793) (0.805) (0.826) (0.788) (0.848)
Debt/asset −0.285 −0.209 −0.226 −0.220 −0.214 −0.154
(0.234) (0.216) (0.216) (0.218) (0.215) (0.212)
Volatility 1.345*** 1.262*** 1.269*** 1.293*** 1.259*** 1.271***
(0.267) (0.262) (0.262) (0.264) (0.263) (0.270)
Domestic ownership −0.908** −0.316 −0.284 −0.314 −0.331 −0.370
(0.347) (0.347) (0.348) (0.347) (0.346) (0.366)
Managerial ownership 0.036 0.930† 0.862† 0.983† 0.944† 0.676
(0.509) (0.509) (0.511) (0.509) (0.507) (0.530)
Executives bonus ratio 0.174 0.082 0.117 0.075 0.077 0.144
(0.326) (0.316) (0.316) (0.315) (0.316) (0.322)
Dividend 0.707*** 0.827*** 0.810*** 0.841*** 0.821*** 0.768***
(0.167) (0.166) (0.167) (0.167) (0.166) (0.169)
Keiretsu 0.109 0.059 0.063 0.058 0.058 0.103
(0.146) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.146)
Subsidiary −0.344† −0.252 −0.252 −0.259 −0.241 −0.306†
(0.177) (0.171) (0.172) (0.172) (0.171) (0.178)
Management controlled 0.479* 0.390† 0.407† 0.368† 0.382† 0.392†
(0.218) (0.216) (0.216) (0.215) (0.216) (0.216)
Prevalence of stock option adoption 0.014** 0.013* 0.013* 0.013* 0.013* 0.014**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood −3,883.359 −3,925.662 −3,924.243 −3,924.428 −3,923.992 −3,870.212
***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05; †p< 0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Five hundred eighty-four adoption for 1,547 firms between 1997 and 2007, 12,580 firm-year spells
in the analysis.
these models (Buis, 2010).6 Therefore, a 1 standard
deviation increase in Elite managers (i.e., 0.175)
6 Suppose the model is h(t)= h(baseline)× exp(𝛽1x1 +
𝛽2x2 + 𝛽12x1x2), then in the multiplicative term, the marginal
effect of x1 on proportional change in the hazard rate h(t) is
exp(𝛽1 + 𝛽12x2), depending on the value of x2. In our case, x1 is
the Foreign ownership, and the x2 is the moderator variable for
example Elite managers.
will multiply the effect of Foreign ownership on the
proportional change in hazard rate of adopting stock
option pay by 178 percent (i.e., exp(0.175× 3.306).
Similarly, a 1 standard deviation increase in Pay
inequality (i.e., 0.53) increases multiplicatively the
hazard rate by 147 percent (i.e., exp(0.53× 0.733).
But a 1 standard deviation increase in Sales growth
(i.e., 5.64) decreases multiplicatively the hazard rate
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by 23 percent (i.e., exp(5.6× (−0.261)). Figure 1
(G1–G3) shows the marginal multiplicative effect
of Foreign ownership at different values of these
moderating variables, averaged across all observa-
tions. While the coefficient of Foreign ownership
is not significant in Model 6, possibly due to the
multicollinearity in the model, Figure 1 indicates
that the average effect of it is significantly positive
(95% confidence interval above the zero line).
But the multiplicative effect in the Cox model
cannot gauge the linear change in the probability of
a firm in adopting stock option pay (Buis, 2010).
Alternatively, we run an ordinary probit model.
Although the probit model is not very suitable to this
sample with the panel data structure, it gives quanti-
tatively similar results (Model 6 in Table 3). There-
fore, we use the coefficients in the probit model
to interpret the linear change in the adoption prob-
ability. We follow the approach of Norton, Wang
and Ai (2004) and calculate the actual interaction
effect for different adoption probability associated
with different value of all other variables (formally,
𝜕2F(u)/𝜕x1𝜕x2 where F(u) is the normal cumulative
distribution function). Figure 1 shows the effects
(G4–G6) and the z-statistics (G7–G9 correspond-
ing to G4–G6). While there is variation in the inter-
action effects, they are generally consistent with
the sign of the coefficients of the interaction terms.
For instance, while the interaction effect of Foreign
ownership and Elite managers changes when adop-
tion probability increases (G4 in Figure 1), the inter-
action effect is always positive, as indicated by the
sign of the coefficient (Model 6 in Table 3 and the
line in G4). But this interaction effect is not signif-
icant when the probability is less than 0.2 (in G7
of Figure 1, the dots are not always higher than the
line of 1.96, which indicates the 95% confidence
interval). This suggests that in the initial stage of
the diffusion, the interaction effect is not significant.
The same thing can be said about the Pay inequality
(G5 and G8 of Figure 1); while the overall interac-
tion effect is positive, it is most significant when the
adoption probability is higher than 0.2, after which
the dots converge to be higher than the line of 1.645,
which indicates a 90 percent confidence interval.
For Sales growth, the interaction effect is nega-
tive and becomes more negative when the adop-
tion probability increases (G6 and G9 of Figure 1).
Again, the interaction effect is more pronounced
when the probability is higher than 0.2 where the
dots converge to be lower than the line -1.96, which
indicates the 95 percent confidence interval.
Robustness tests
In sum, we find supporting results for all our
hypotheses. To check the robustness of our find-
ings, we tested several additional variables as con-
trol variables: executive total compensation, ratio of
executive compensation to earning, proportion of
tax payment over earnings, and whether the firm
has a cross-listing in a foreign exchange. None of
them is significant or has much impact on the main
results. We also tested some industry related vari-
ables such as industry sales growth, growth volatil-
ity, average profitability, and two-digit industries
dummies. These variables did not provide addi-
tional information to the fixed three-digit industry
effects.
Although we have adopted the lagged variables
in the estimation, which has accounted for the
reversed causality, our results may suffer from the
simultaneity issue in which both the stock option
pay adoption and foreign ownership are influenced
simultaneously by some unobserved factors and
therefore foreign investors are attracted to firms
that are more likely to adopt stock option pay. For
example, some industries have attracted a high
volume of foreign investment, becoming more
internationalized, and gradually more accommo-
dating to new practices. We calculated the average
foreign ownership in three-digit industries and used
it in the model to replace the industry dummies.
Indeed we found that in those industries with higher
average foreign ownership (highest in petroleum
and pharmaceutical industries, which normally have
high profitability), firms are significantly (p< 1%)
more likely to adopt stock option pay. But the main
results based on moderators remain unchanged
after controlling for this. We also controlled for the
export and foreign sales, but they are not significant
in models and our key results remain. Lastly, we
rerun Model 6 with standard errors clustered for
each firm to account for firm-specific unobserved
factors. The result is almost identical. Moreover,
we conducted the firm random-effect probit model
(Model 7 in Table 3) to control for the unobserved
firm factors and the results are consistent.
Another potential endogeneity issue is that stock
option pay can be adopted to attract more foreign
owners. We did find that foreign ownership on aver-
age increased in those firms that had adopted stock
option pay. However, we also found that the change
in foreign ownership one year after the stock option
pay adoption can be both positive and negative.
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Table 3. The likelihood of the adoption of stock option pay for executives using Probit models
Two-stage probit models
Ordinary
probit
model
Random
effects
probit model
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Foreign ownership 1.129† −0.246 −0.299 1.124† −1.490 0.459 0.674
(0.604) (1.001) (1.090) (0.605) (1.331) (0.434) (0.519)
Foreign ownership× elite
managers
7.898† 7.705† 2.311* 2.315†
(4.405) (4.407) (1.102) (1.410)
Foreign ownership× pay
inequality
1.436† 1.278 0.513† 0.610†
(0.867) (0.884) (0.295) (0.338)
Foreign ownership× sales
growth
−0.235** −0.242** −0.171* −0.114
(0.087) (0.087) (0.068) (0.075)
Elite managers 0.315* −0.479 0.321* 0.310† −0.464 0.041 −0.024
(0.160) (0.447) (0.160) (0.160) (0.448) (0.207) (0.267)
Pay inequality 0.054 0.064 −0.152 0.055 −0.120 −0.029 −0.043
(0.040) (0.040) (0.130) (0.040) (0.129) (0.062) (0.077)
Sales growth 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.064** 0.065** 0.048** 0.031
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.020)
Firm size −0.010 0.014
(0.027) (0.033)
Firm age −0.006*** −0.006*** −0.006*** −0.005** −0.006*** −0.005** −0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Profitability −0.160 −0.101 −0.282 −0.124 −0.171 −0.216 −0.461
(0.492) (0.493) (0.499) (0.497) (0.507) (0.507) (0.622)
Debt/asset −0.091 −0.150 −0.093 −0.087 −0.146 −0.092 −0.285
(0.131) (0.136) (0.130) (0.131) (0.135) (0.119) (0.177)
Volatility 0.970*** 1.003*** 0.994*** 0.976*** 1.030*** 0.975*** 1.064***
(0.194) (0.195) (0.195) (0.194) (0.196) (0.194) (0.224)
Domestic ownership −0.186 −0.220 −0.167 −0.201 −0.217 −0.147 −0.273
(0.208) (0.210) (0.209) (0.208) (0.211) (0.189) (0.262)
Managerial ownership 0.489 0.297 0.589† 0.490 0.390 0.518† 0.824*
(0.347) (0.365) (0.351) (0.347) (0.369) (0.296) (0.393)
Executives bonus ratio 0.065 0.165 0.062 0.062 0.156 0.073 0.043
(0.185) (0.194) (0.185) (0.185) (0.195) (0.182) (0.216)
Dividend 0.403*** 0.375*** 0.431*** 0.409*** 0.407*** 0.404*** 0.568***
(0.096) (0.097) (0.097) (0.096) (0.099) (0.094) (0.125)
Keiretsu 0.036 0.026 0.032 0.039 0.025 0.031 0.013
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.073) (0.096)
Subsidiary −0.160† −0.150† −0.167† −0.153† −0.150† −0.152† −0.135
(0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.086) (0.114)
Management controlled 0.311† 0.338* 0.278 0.303† 0.301† 0.295† 0.231
(0.169) (0.170) (0.170) (0.169) (0.171) (0.158) (0.206)
Prevalence of stock
option adoption
0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** −0.004 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
Constant −1.830*** −1.671*** −1.653*** −1.861*** −1.546*** −1.659*** −2.730***
(0.433) (0.443) (0.447) (0.434) (0.457) (0.447) (0.465)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model statistics P value of the Wald test of exogeneity Pseudo R2 Log-likelihood
0.859 0.405 0.501 0.223 0.219 0.157 −1, 984.411
***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05; †p< 0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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The average change in foreign ownership in the
adopting firms is not statistically different (p= 0.52)
from the average change in foreign ownership in the
nonadopting firms.
To address this endogeneity issue further, we can
treat foreign ownership as the endogenous variable
and its interaction with moderator variables also
endogenous in the estimation. Unfortunately,
the Cox model does not have the capability to
handle the endogeneity. We therefore resort to
the next best alternative and used the two-stage
probit model (“ivprobit” in Stata). The results
(second-stage coefficients) are reported in Table 3
(Models 1–5). We use Firm size as the instrumental
variable because it is highly correlated with Foreign
ownership but unrelated to the adoption decision.
We use the interaction between predicted foreign
ownership from the first stage and moderating vari-
ables (e.g., Elite managers) as the new instrumental
variable (Wooldridge, 2002). The results using this
approach generated supporting evidence to our
hypotheses as well.
It is possible that stock option pay was not used
to pursue managerial self-interest, but to attract
talented managers to the firm to improve firm
performance. Even though hiring executive-level
managers from the external labor market is not
common in Japanese firms (Colpan and Yoshikawa,
2012), we checked whether stock option pay leads
to CEO turnover. There were fewer than 20 firms
of such cases, out of 584 adopting firms. Removing
these firms from the sample does not change our
empirical results.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study aims to understand how and why local
organizations adopt a corporate governance prac-
tice developed with foreign institutional logic that is
not consistent with the prevailing local institutional
logic. We have provided a new perspective focusing
on how change-minded managers can navigate
between alternative institutional logics to adopt the
new practice to serve their self-interest, facilitating
the diffusion of the practice. We argue that stock
option pay is preferred by foreign owners, but
also financially attractive to managers of Japanese
firms. Therefore, to achieve their own private goals,
managers may leverage foreign ownership and its
associated shareholder logic to justify the adoption
of this new pay scheme in the Japanese stakeholder
environment. We show empirical evidence that the
effect of foreign ownership on the adoption of stock
option pay is greater when Japanese managers have
more elite educational background, higher pay
inequality relative to other employees, or when
the firm faces slower sales growth. The findings
suggest that the diffusion of stock option pay can be
facilitated when managers leverage the opportunity
offered by an alternative institutional logic in the
local institutional environment.
This study enriches research on the introduc-
tion of new or contentious corporate governance
practices into an institutional context that fol-
lows different logic. In a globalized economy,
the process by which practices are transferred
across institutional boundaries is an important
issue for theoretical inquiry (Dacin, Goodstein,
and Scott, 2002). Although our understanding of
how institution-embedded organizations respond
differently in adopting these new practices has been
greatly advanced by previous studies, this field
still remains understudied (Greenwood et al., 2011;
Kraatz and Block, 2008; Pache and Santos, 2010;
Seo and Creed, 2002). Some studies focused on
the influence of powerful and resourceful organiza-
tional actors espousing different institutional logic
(e.g., Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005; Desender
et al., 2014; Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Sanders and
Tuschke, 2007). More recent studies have taken a
socio-political perspective and paid attention to the
role of the embedded agencies (Greenwood et al.,
2010) who are receptive to the changing ideas or
are motivated to change (Chung and Luo, 2008a;
Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Kraatz and Moore, 2002),
and thus manage to spread the new practices that
are seemingly inconsistent with the dominant local
logic. We join the latter line of inquiry on change
agents but we depart from the existing literature
in one important aspect; in particular, we suggest
that motivated change agents (i.e., managers) can
utilize other powerful actors (i.e., foreign owners)
and their espoused institutional logic for the needed
legitimacy in adopting a new practice. Therefore,
this study not only provides one process to solve the
“paradox of embedded action” (Holm, 1995; Seo
and Creed, 2002), but also explores the conditions
under which specific responses are mobilized under
multiple institutional demands (Pache and Santos,
2010). This perspective can be extended to study
the adoption of other practices, such as downsizing
or an independent board, which have diffused
across national institutional boundaries but have
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been contested due to the incompatible institutional
pressures from multiple institutional logics.
From a broader perspective, this study speaks
to the growing behavioral governance research
(Westphal and Zajac, 2013). It has been found that
corporate leaders tend to navigate the prevailing
institutional logic to manage their relationship with
the external constituents of the firm or pursue their
private benefit. For example, managers produce
favorable justification for their behaviors and
decisions through changing the explanation for
their use of long-term incentive plans when the
prevailing institutional logic of corporate gover-
nance changes from “corporate logic” to “agency
logic” (Zajac and Westphal, 1995, 2004). When the
institutional logic evolves to “neocorporate logic”,
executives tend to use impression management to
emphasize their distinctive talent and resource to
justify the quality of leadership (Westphal and Park,
2012). Sometimes they refer to the conformation
to the board of director independence to justify
symbolically the quality of management even when
the performance is less satisfactory (Westphal and
Park, 2012). Our findings are consistent with this
perspective and extend it to show how managers
can proactively utilize the coexistence of alternative
logics to justify their behaviors. Moreover, in the
literature of symbolic management in corporate
governance (Westphal and Zajac, 1994, 2013),
corporate leaders may symbolically conform to the
dominant institutional logic but decouple it from
the actual implementation without realizing the
value embodied in the institutional logic. We follow
this train of thought and suggest that managers may
adopt a new practice to realize their own interests,
without necessarily accepting the superiority of its
value and institutional logic.
This study also contributes to the research on
embedded agencies by identifying the boundary
conditions for their behaviors. Our theoretical
arguments can be applied to other institutional
contexts; however, we wish to highlight that
the stakeholder-oriented context is a necessary
condition for the inroad of shareholder logic into
Japanese companies. Given that stakeholder logic
prescribes a balanced view of accommodating the
interests and requests of all influential stakeholders
(e.g., Fiss and Zajac, 2004), it legitimizes the
interest of arm’s length investors as well even if
they are upholding shareholder logic. It is this bal-
anced perspective underpinning stakeholder logic
that makes the leveraging behavior of motivated
Japanese managers possible. This line of reasoning
can be useful for future studies. It suggests that not
all institutional logics are equally accommodating
to foreign interests and to new practices carrying
incompatible institutional logic. The diffusion of
best practices in corporate governance may be more
from shareholder logic to stakeholder logic. This
can inform studies on the global convergence of
corporate governance practices (e.g., Aguilera and
Jackson, 2003), which have not yet fully examined
the asymmetry of the infusion of one governance
logic into another. Future studies can investigate
the validity of this conjecture and examine other
conditional factors that can impede or facilitate
the infusion of shareholder logic into stakeholder
logic. It is equally interesting to investigate how
stakeholder logic can infuse into shareholder logic.
Future studies can help overcome the limitations
in this study. First of all, without available data
on the identity of each foreign owner, we had to
use the aggregated measure and assumed that they
all follow shareholder logic. The heterogeneity in
foreign ownership may have potential impact on
managerial behavior and the diffusion of a new
practice. Second, we estimated the model based
on the observables such as educational background
and sales growth to infer the underlying manage-
rial interests and behaviors. But the true motives for
managers and how they leverage institutional logic
can be heterogeneous, which can only be revealed
through more direct measure using interviews or
surveys. Third, we notice that the interaction effects
in our sample are quite dispersed in the initial dif-
fusion stage when the adoption probability is low.
The investigation of this heterogeneity at differ-
ent stages of adopting a new practice may help
reveal more about how alternative or incompatible
institutional logics interact and influence manage-
rial behaviors. Furthermore, researchers can explore
how alternative or competing institutional logics
influence one another. For example, local stakehold-
ers and managers may learn from foreign investors
and their logic, leading to the gradual evolution
of local institutional logic (Ahmadjian and Rob-
bins, 2005). When the content of institutional logic
increasingly resembles with one another, manage-
rial response to the incompatibility between institu-
tional logics may evolve as well. For instance, one
interesting future direction can be the hybridization
of competing logics in one organization (Ingram
and Simons, 2000; Yoshikawa et al., 2007). In addi-
tion, future studies can explore how stock option
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pay that has been adopted as a result of managerial
manipulation impacts the firm performance.
The increasing globalization of capital markets
and institutional investment has facilitated the trans-
fer of governance practices from one institutional
context to another. Our study shows that managers
play a crucial role in the diffusion of new practices
in an institutional environment. These managers can
either passively balance different demands based
on different institutional logics, or can proactively
leverage the multiplicity of institutional logics to
serve their own interests. Our study shows the
latter case.
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